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Abstract: Key’s (2016) target article provides some strong arguments but also makes some 
logical mistakes. The arguments are not sufficient to support a definite conclusion that fish 
cannot feel pain. A multi-faceted perspective taking into account brain structure, chemical 
secretion in brain, animal behavior, and evolutionary biology may be useful and appears, at least 
in some aspects, to suggest the opposite conclusion from that of the target article. 
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Whether fish can feel pain is a very important question both conceptually and practically, 
affecting our appropriate treatment, including consumption, of them. The target article by Key 
(2016) thus tackles an important issue. It also provides a very specific view with some strong 
arguments. However, in my view, they are not strong enough to support the definite conclusion 
that fish cannot feel pain. 
 
A different if not opposite view (e.g., Panksepp 2011, Mashour & Alkire 2013, Damasio & 
Carvalho 2013) is that the capacity for feeling pain evolved very early in evolutionary history — 
that at least all mammals and probably all vertebrates have that capacity, and that it is located 
deep in the lower brain structures like the brain stem, rather than in the cerebral cortex not 
possessed by fish. Strong evidence has also been given to support this opposite view. Key also 
provides strong evidence in favor of his view and discusses this opposite view. The evidence, 
though strong, is not conclusive for either side, at least in itself. Thus, there is a need to take a 
wider perspective considering other relevant facets. Before discussing this perspective (not 
exhaustively), I will touch on some problems of Key’s arguments. 
 
Having acknowledged the overall strength of his arguments, I will focus on the problems. The 
most important is that the arguments are not sufficient to support a definite negative 
conclusion that fish do not feel pain. True, the feeling of pain in humans may involve the several 
factors and the corresponding neuroanatomical features discussed by Key that fish do not 
possess. However, we cannot conclude that a jet plane cannot fly because it does not have a 
propeller (to use a well-known analogy). Logically, a condition A sufficient to give rise to B needs 
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not be a necessary condition for B. Thus, many researchers believe that the telencephalon and 
pallium in fish may be performing functions equivalent to some functions of our cerebral cortex. 
 
There is another logical mistake. Key argues that “neither the medial pallium nor the whole 
pallium is required for escape behaviours from electric shock stimuli in fish. Therefore, given 
that the pallium is not even involved in nociceptive behaviours, it could not be inferred to play a 
role in pain” (Portavella et al., 2004). Using the same logic, one could argue: “The arm 
withdrawal reflex in humans is effected by the spinal cord. Therefore, given that the human 
brain is not even involved in the nociceptive behavior of the arm withdrawal reflex, it could not 
be inferred to play a role in pain.” What is not involved in a lower function needs not be 
incapable of a higher function. 
 
What is essential to explain the feeling of pain, or in fact any other conscious feeling, is the 
capability for subjectivity. Despite the significant advances in neuroscience (as eloquently 
outlined by, e.g., Ramachandran 2012) in the last two to three decades, the explanation of this 
“hard problem” of consciousness is nowhere in sight. This does not mean that contributions like 
Key’s target article are useless or cannot cast some useful light on the hard problem. We should 
be cautious, however, not to insist on a definite conclusion without sufficient justification. A 
definite conclusion is difficult if not impossible to achieve at this stage of our knowledge. We 
may nevertheless obtain a better perspective by taking different facets into account.  
 
One method is to examine the secretion of chemicals in the brain indicative of certain feelings 
(like pain) in humans. For example, using this method, Fossat (2014) showed that even 
invertebrate crayfish appear to be capable of anxiety, indicating that the spectrum of animal 
species capable of affective feelings is likely to be very wide. If some invertebrates are capable 
of anxiety, the claim that fish (a vertebrate) cannot feel pain (a more basic feeling than anxiety) 
must be treated with caution. 
 
Another method is the observation of animal behavior to see whether they appear to be 
capable of feeling or even sentient states (e.g., moral feelings) higher than just basic conscious 
feelings. Though we should be cautious to avoid being misguided by our tendency towards 
anthropomorphism, some insights are possible. For informative and interesting accounts of the 
many impressive capacities for feeling, including even moral feelings of many animal species, 
see Balcombe (2010) and Bekoff (2013). 
 
Lastly, I want to mention the use of evolutionary biology to help us answer the difficult question 
of which species are capable of consciousness. Key also mentions and uses evolutionary biology; 
however, he does not use the following useful principle I advanced two decades ago (Ng 1995). 
As also discussed in Ng (2016), using compelling axioms based on the principles of evolutionary 
biology, I show that a species must be flexible for its members to be capable of affective feelings. 
Roughly speaking, the brain mechanism giving rise to feelings must consume energy. If these 
feelings do not affect the flexible choices of the species, they do not contribute to their survival 
and reproductive fitness, and hence cannot survive evolutionary competition. In evolutionary 
equilibrium, such species would have been eliminated by natural selection. Thus, affective 
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species (those capable of having affects like pain and pleasure) must be flexible, that is, not 
having all their behavior hard-wired genetically. This turns the difficult question about 
consciousness into one about flexible behavior (still difficult but less so). If we can establish that 
the behavior of a species is completely inflexible, we may regard its members as not capable of 
feelings, including pain. In contrast, species capable of flexible choices are presumed to be 
capable of welfare (positive or negative). 
 
Using the principle above, the question of whether fish feel pain is related to whether fish are 
capable of making flexible choices, but Key does not address this issue. Perhaps future 
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